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Abstract 
Several socio-legal scholars have studied how the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex) was 
empowered by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and how, under this transition, its standards 
became quasi-binding. What has gone less studied is how the WTO has transformed the very modus 
operandi of Codex. In particular, it has been argued that the WTO has infused Codex with a 
technocratic ethos. Building on this scholarship, this article investigates the dynamic relationship 
between the WTO and Codex and the evolving role of expert knowledge in the global regime for food 
safety standards. The article’s main thesis is that technocracy (as the rule of the knowers) is an 
unsustainable regulatory paradigm in the field of global food safety standards, as evidenced by the 
controversial ractopamine case, discussed in the article. The article concludes by arguing that the 
global food safety regime is turning towards a paradigm that marries science with democratic values. 
Keywords 
World Trade Organization; Sanitary and Phitosanitary Agreement; Codex Alimentarius Commission; 
Food Safety Standards; Risk Regulation; Global technocracy 
 
 1 
1. Introduction* 
The standardization of food safety on a global scale is a particularly challenging endeavour because of 
the very nature of food, which is central to the well-being, identity and the very essence of human 
beings, as illustrated by the old saying ‘we are what we eat’. Two main bodies are co-producing the 
global regime for food safety standards: the Codex Alimentarius Commission (hereafter referred to as 
Codex)
1
 and the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Codex can be safely considered as the global regulatory agency in the field of food safety. It is 
rather uncontested that the WTO has contributed to the transformation of Codex from a rather obscure 
standard-setting institution into a powerful global regulatory agency. The adoption of the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) and the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreements transformed Codex 
standards from merely voluntarily standards to quasi-binding obligations. Socio-legal scholars have 
amply studied the transition by which Codex standards have become quasi-binding. What has gone 
less studied, however, is how the WTO has transformed the philosophy underpinning the 
standardization work of Codex. At a closer scrutiny of the history of Codex empowerment, it becomes 
clear that Codex was not simply vested with regulatory powers by the WTO, but its modus operandi 
was profoundly influenced by the WTO. In particular, it has been argued that the WTO has infused 
Codex with a technocratic ethos.  
Building on this scholarship, this article sets out to investigate the dynamic relationship between 
the WTO and Codex and shed light on the evolving role of expert knowledge in the global regime for 
food safety standards. The article’s main thesis is that technocracy (as the rule of the knowers) is an 
unsustainable regulatory paradigm in the field of global food safety standards. The technocratic 
paradigm rests on an idealized conceptualization of science, according to which science (and scientific 
experts) can solve international disputes over food safety policy. Such vision of science – or better 
Science, capital S - has been criticized by a wide scholarship. The controversial ractopamine case, 
discussed in the article, bears witness of the limits of a purely technocratic approach to global food 
safety standards. The article concludes with a note of optimism (at least from the perspective of this 
author), showing how the global food safety regime is turning towards a paradigm that marries science 
with democratic values. 
The article is organized as following. The next section introduces the reader to the area of 
international food safety standards, by tracing the evolution of the international food standards regime, 
from the early twentieth century to our days. Section 3 analyses the regulatory philosophy 
underpinning this evolving regime. It will be shown that the initial Codex regime was not build around 
the Science paradigm, but was aimed at creating food standards following what is called a multiple 
approach. It is only after the establishment of the WTO that the practice of risk assessment became 
central within the organization of Codex. Section 4 zooms-in on the ractopamine case; this case, which 
echoes the previous hormones case, well illustrates the problematic features of a regime based on a 
naïve conception of science, where values apparently play no role. To further substantiate this thesis, 
this section briefly reviews the social science scholarship shedding light on how values unavoidably 
shape science. It is further argued, in Section 5, that the recent evolution of WTO jurisprudence 
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departs from the technocratic ethos, allegedly underpinning the global food safety regime. Being the 
global food safety regime coproduced by WTO and Codex institutions, this section looks also at the 
vision of science endorsed by key documents of Codex such as the Working Principles for Risk 
Analysis and it finds some coherence within the regime. Section 6 draws conclusions.  
2. The international food standards regime: from early days to today 
A. The pre-Codex regime (in a nutshell) 
In the early twentieth century, a varieties of transnational initiatives of food standardization emerged 
to facilitate trade in food products. Standardization initiatives intensified in the fifties. At the 
international level, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization 
(WHO),
 2
 started joint work on a number of issues related to food quality and safety. In 1955 they 
established the Joint WHO/FAO Expert Committee on Food Additives (JECFA), still operating as one 
of the scientific committees advising Codex.
3
 Building on the work that the International Dairy 
Federation started in the thirties, FAO did also convene the Committee of government experts on the 
Code of Principles concerning Milk and Milk Products. Next to these initiatives, two projects of 
regional standardizations were also set up.
4
 In 1958 the Council of the Codex Alimentarius Europaeus 
was first proposed by the then Austrian Minister for Agriculture Hans Frenzel, and it was created 
under the aegis of the International Commission on Agricultural Industries and the Permanent Bureau 
of Analytical Chemistry.
5
 In 1959, several Latin American countries also created their own Code, the 
Código Latino-Americano de Alimentos.
6
 In order to overcome the fragmentation of this system and 
to better address the challenges of international trade, the FAO and WHO launched the joint 
FAO/WHO food standard programme, in 1962 in Geneva.
7
 One year later the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission was born as a subsidiary body of FAO and WHO, with the mandate of implementing the 
programme.
8
 Codex would have also subsumed and continued the work of the Codex Europaeus.  
B. The Birth of Codex (the pre-WTO regime) 
Codex is a multilayered international body, composed by a multitude of committees dealing with both 
horizontal and vertical issues: next to an Executive Committee, there are 11 commodity committees 
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 FAO and WHO were created respectively on 16 October 1945 and 7 April 1948. 
3
 N Rees and D Watson (ed.), International Standards for Food Safety (2000), p. 4. 
4
 For an overview of the early history of Codex see http://www.codexalimentarius.org/about-codex/codex-timeline/en/ (last 
visited 21 March 2014). 
5
 This code was in turn the evolution of the Code and standards developed under the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which 
were consolidated in the Codex Alimentarius Austriacus; for a more detailed account see M Masson-Matthee, The Codex 
Alimentarius Commission and Its Standards (2007), pp. 13-15 
6
 CA Guajardo, Código alimentario argentino: su valoración juridical (1998), available at 
http://www.worldcat.org/title/codigo-alimentario-argentino-su-valoracion-juridica/oclc/39456182/viewport (last visited 8 
May 2014).  
7
 The proposal to ‘internationalize’ the already existing standards was made by the Council of the Codex Alimentarius 
Europeaus (see Masson-Matthee, above note 5, for an overview of this process). From this angle Codex can be seen as 
the continuation of the Codex Alimentarius Europeaus. This may explain the preponderant influence exercised by 
European actors on Codex in the first years of its existence. 
8
 Codex was first approved by the FAO and later by the WHO Assembly. Cfr. Resolution No. 12/61 of the FAO 
Conference, ‘Codex Alimentarius’, adopted at the 11th Session of the FAO Conference, Report of the 11th Session of the 
FAO Conference, Rome 4-24 November 1961, para. 263. Resolution WHA 16.24 ‘Joint FAO/WHO Programme on Food 
Standards (Codex Alimentarius)’, adopted at the 16th Session of the World Health Assembly, Geneva 7-23 May 1963, 
Off. Rec. World Health Organization, 124, 74. 
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(e.g. Codex Committee on Milk and Milk Products, Codex Committee on Cocoa products and 
Chocolate) and 10 General subject committees (e.g. Codex Committee on Food Additives and 
Contaminants).
9
 Each committee is administered, organized and financed by a Codex Member (so 
called host country); most commonly, countries that have a specific interest on a certain Codex issue 
are the host of that specific committee (e.g. Switzerland is the host country for the Codex Committee 
on Cocoa products and Chocolate). The scientific meta-analysis that are used in Codex 
decisionmaking process are produced by one of the several expert committees, which have been 
jointly established by the WHO and FAO and provide the studies that are further used to adopt 
standards (e.g. the JECFA and the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Meetings on Microbiological Risk 
Assessment (JEMRA)). The decision-making process of Codex consists of an eight-step procedure, 
starting with the proposal of a standard by a Committee or a Member, followed by several evaluations 
and discussions (step 2 to 7) and ending with the submission of the standards for adoption by the 
Codex Commission.
10
 At step 2, a draft text is prepared and an assessment by an expert body (e.g. 
JECFA) with recommendations of Acceptable Daily Intakes (ADIs) and/or Maximum Residue Levels 
(MRLs) is prepared. This is arguably one of the most important phases of the decision-making process 
because experts’ recommendations are typically endorsed in the final standards.  
The 1962 Report of the joint FOA/WHO Conference that has led to the establishment of Codex 
sheds light on the purpose and scope of Codex and on the nature and types of standards. The 
Guidelines for Codex standards, part of the 1962 Report, clarify that food standards have a dual 
purpose: protect consumers’ health and ensure ‘fair practices in food trade’.11 The Guidelines draw a 
distinction between ‘minimum platform standard’ and ‘trading standards’. The former are to be 
‘acceptable on as wide basis as possible (on the understanding that acceptance of the minimum 
standard in no way limits the existence or establishment of higher national standards)’. Trading 
standards by contrast are characterized as ‘higher’ standards. These standards are not per se superior, 
but are a ‘matter of consumer preference’.12 These standards imply that members accepting them 
should not restrict the importation of those products on the basis of food safety/quality considerations. 
The latter standards were mainly conceived for more integrated communities, such as regional areas. 
With very few exceptions (e.g. the European standard on fresh fungus ‘chantarelle’), the development 
of regional Codex standards never materialized and global standards became the norm in Codex.
13
  
C. The post-WTO regime 
The pre-1995 Codex regime has been described as a ‘gentlemen’s club’.14 Standards were mainly 
voluntary, and Codex members followed the norm of not obstructing the adoption of standards, even if 
these were not in their interests. The number of delegates attending Committees meetings was overall 
small, which facilitated a process of consensus building. Accordingly, standards were always adopted 
by consensus, even if the procedural manual provided for voting, in cases when such consensus could 
not be reached.
15
 The voluntary nature of the standards and the small size of meetings to reach 
agreements were radically changed with the establishment of the WTO. The principal legal framework 
that has enabled this transformation is the WTO Sanitary and Phitosanitary Agreement (SPS 
Agreement), which provides that Members shall either base their measures on international standards 
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 For a more detailed explanation of how these committees operate see Masson-Matthee, above note 5, 2007, at 31-50. 
10
 Codex Alimentarius Commission, Procedural Manual, (2013) 21st ed., at 31. 
11
 Report of the Joint FAO/WHO Conference on Food Standards, Geneva, 1-5, October 1962, at para 1, Part I. 
12
 1962 Report, above note 11, p. 7. 
13
 Masson-Matthee, above note 5.  
14
 F Veggeland and SO Borgen, ‘Negotiating International Food Standards’ The World Trade Organisation’s Impact on the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission’(2005), 18(4) Governance 675. 
15
 Codex Procedural Manual (2013), above note 10. 
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or on science and risk assessment. Article 3.1 and 3.2 SPS Agreement provide that ‘[t]o harmonize 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures ... Members shall base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on 
international standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they exist;’ and that (2) Sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures which conform to international standards, guidelines or recommendations 
shall be ... presumed to be consistent with the relevant provisions of this Agreement and of GATT 
1994’.16 Since Codex is listed among the international standardization bodies, it is clear that 
conformity with Codex standards implies almost invariably conformity with WTO law. A contrario, 
the decision to set standards higher than the Codex ones, imposes on Members a higher burden to 
defend its own measures. Moreover, the WTO is endowed with a uniquely strong dispute settlement 
system. Under the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), disputes were initiated only on 
the basis of consensus. Equally, rulings by Panels were adopted by consensus. Under the WTO, 
disputes and the adoption of rulings are quasi-automatic. In case of non-compliance, complaining 
Members are authorized to retaliate (suspension of concessions).
17
 The WTO enforcement system is 
accordingly one of the most powerful in the international legal arena. For this reason, the nature of 
post-1995 Codex standards has been characterized as ‘semi-binding’.18 The new normativity gained by 
Codex standards may explain why voting has been resorted to at Codex, in the post-WTO era.
19
 By 
virtue of the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT Agreement), Codex is also relevant for 
technical barriers to trade, such as labelling. While this Agreement does not explicitly refer to Codex, 
it does refer to international standards as benchmark for legality of regulatory measures that may 
adversely impact trade and it is highly likely that Codex standards qualify as international standards.  
The fact that, as of today, virtually no measures disputed at the WTO and diverging from Codex 
standards has been found WTO compatible may be indicative of the new role played by the post-SPS 
Codex standards. The words of a European Commission representative, commenting the new regime, 
well capture this transition: ‘In the past, if we disagreed with Codex Standards … we could ignore and 
take our own legislation. Now we can’t.’20  
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 Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Annex 1A, 15 April 1994 (hereafter ‘SPS 
Agreement’). 
17
 For a more detailed explanation see P van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization (2013) (3rd 
Edition). 
18
 Veggeland and SO Borge, above note 14. 
19
 Yet, the prediction by some that voting would have become the main decision-making mechanism did not materialize. In 
fact, consensus remains the customary practice and voting was used only in few controversial cases, such as the approval 
of standards for growth promoting hormones and for ractopamine discussion below section 4. 
20
 From an interview reported by F Veggeland and SO Borge, above note 14, at 683, conducted by the authors in 2000 with 
an employee of DG Consumer and Health Protection at the European Commission, conducted and. 
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3. Global Food Safety Standards: Co-production and the emergence of a technocratic 
ethos 
Several scholars in the past have tried to clarify the relationship between Codex and the WTO.
21
 This 
article adheres to the theory that the international regime for food safety standards is being co-
produced by both Codex and WTO institutions.
22
 One of the central arguments of the co-productionist 
approach is that the WTO has influenced the regulatory philosophy underpinning the global regime for 
food safety standards, by setting ‘Science’ at the centre of the regime.23 To better understand this 
argument, it is worth to first identify the approach underpinning Codex in the pre-WTO era.  
A. The Origin: the Multiple Approach 
‘It is due to its scientific basis that Codex texts are considered by WTO as the international 
reference for food safety standards.’
24
 Codex Website  
The narrative of the official Codex website suggests that the international trade regime has chosen 
Codex for its adherence to a scientific paradigm. This narrative, however, may be somewhat 
reductivist and a glimpse into Codex’s history sheds lights on the different factors that have played a 
role in the food standardization processes developed by Codex. If it is normal today to associate 
Codex standards with science, the early years of Codex were not characterized by a science-centric 
approach.  
The 1962 Guidelines briefly discussed in the previous section, did not endorse science as the main 
paradigm underlying the new standardization project. While science is undoubtedly one of the factors 
that should be resorted to when adopting Codex standards, the Guidelines refer to a multiplicity of 
criteria, as evidenced by the following paragraph: ‘The Conference drew attention to the many 
problems involved in setting up such standards and emphasized the need to study them from the 
health, scientific, technological, economic and administrative points of view. Only by following this 
multiple approach would it be possible to make the widely desired progress in this fields’.25 Such an 
approach appears reconcilable with legal pluralism and more at odds with a universalistic vision of 
science that enables the formation of uniform global standards. This is further exemplified in the 
possibility granted by the 1962 Guidelines of adopting different standards for the same product. The 
Guidelines in fact clarify that when there is a division of views, ‘two or more standards could be 
proposed, each with its own area of application’.26 This is better understood because Codex was 
initially conceived as a forum where also regional standards could have been adopted. Hence, in no 
case standards wanted by one region could have been rejected by outside countries. In this context it is 
interesting to read in the Guidelines that ‘a food standard … does not intend to affect consumer 
preference, but aims at ensuring that the consumer can know what he is buying’.27 By granting a status 
to consumer preferences, the Guidelines implicitly concede that factors other than science may play a 
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 T Buthe, ‘The Globalization of Health and Safety Standards: Delegation of Regulatory Authority in the SPS Agreement 
of the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation’ (2008) Law and Contemporary Problems, 219; F 
Veggeland and SO Borge above note 14, DE Winickoff and D Bushey, ‘Science and Power in Global Food Regulation: 
The Rise of the Codex Alimentarius’ (2010) 35 Science, Technology, & Human Values 356.  
22
 Codex institutions comprise the many committees and subsidiary bodies operating within Codex realm. WTO institutions 
include the rules as drafted in the final Agreements (most importantly the provisions of the SPS and the TBT Agreement) 
and the evolution of these rules through the process of interpretation by the WTO quasi-judicial bodies. 
23
 Winickoff and Bushey, above note 21. 
24
 Text available at the official Codex website under the section ‘Scientific basis for Codex work’, available at 
http://www.codexalimentarius.org/scientific-basis-for-codex/en/, (last visited 21 March 2014).  
25
 1962 Report, letter f, p. 2, emphasis added, above note 11. 
26
 Ibidem ,para 32, p. 12. 
27
 Ibidem, para 7. 
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role in the determination of standards. Overall, the initial regime was not framed within the boundaries 
of the science/risk grammar, that figures prominently in the SPS Agreement. 
B. How the WTO has transformed Codex: Towards ‘sound science’ imperialism?  
According to science and technology studies scholars David Winickoff and Douglas Bushey, the WTO 
has transformed the regulatory epistemology underpinning much of Codex standard setting 
processes.
28
 These scholars focus especially on the SPS Agreement, which they characterize as the 
‘most extreme example’ of the technocratic paradigm promoted by the GATT/WTO regime. 
According to the authors, together with the new normative status, Codex was also endowed with the 
technocratic aspiration of the SPS Agreement. As put by them:  
‘The central coproductionist point is this: although the trading regime claimed to be adopting pre-
existing science based standards at the international level, the WTO’s legal and executive power 
was necessary to transform the Codex into a global agency that could generate such standards. The 
Codex had been an international body with fairly low visibility. As its increase in power became 
imminent, the Codex began acting with an invigorated mandate and a sense of itself as “science 
based” organization. It was the rising trading system that drove the development of new norms and 
practices for the management of knowledge, expertise and evidence in regulatory decision making 
at the Codex – in short its regulatory epistemology’.
29
  
Winickoff and Bushey discuss a number of initiatives launched with the aim of creating the scientific 
framework allegedly necessary for the new scientific identity of Codex. For instance, the 1995 Joint 
FAO/WHO Expert Consultation on the Application of Risk Analysis to Food Standard Issues was 
convened in order to enhance consistency and transparency in these practices. The fact that the 
consultations resulted in recommending changes in Codex practices, in order to promote ‘harmonized 
approaches, consistent with science-based risk assessment’ is a clear indication that the pre-existing 
Codex practices were lacking such consistency.
30
 In short, they contend that a well-established regime 
of ‘risk analysis’ did not exist under the pre-WTO era; it was envisaged and standardized only in the 
post-1995 era. Other scholars have noted how the discussion about the role of science within Codex 
became topical, as it became clear that the normativity of Codex standards would have been 
strengthened by the adoption of the SPS Agreement.
31
 Several reports of joint FAO and WHO 
conferences, starting from 1991 when the negotiations of the SPS Agreement were already 
concluded,
32
 discuss the role of science in Codex. The Codex Committee on General Principles 
(CCGP) was requested to provide guidance on the role science should play in the process of standard 
setting. After lengthy negotiations, the CCGP produced a text, eventually adopted by Codex in 1995, 
with four ‘Statements of Principle concerning the Role of Science in the Codex Decision Making 
Process and the Extent to Which Other Factors are Taken into Account’ (Statements of Principle).33 
The first statement provides that ‘[t]he food standards, guidelines and other recommendations of 
Codex Alimentarius shall be based on the principle of sound scientific analysis and evidence’.34 The 
next statement allows ‘other legitimate factors’ to be taken into account in Codex decision-making 
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 Winickoff and Bushey, above note 21. 
29
 Ibidem, at 360, emphasis added. 
30
 1995 Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation on the Application of Risk Analysis to Food Standard Issues, at 1. 
31
 D Jukes, ‘The Role of Science in International Food Standards’ (2000) 11(3) Food Control, Volume. Available at 
http://www.reading.ac.uk/foodlaw/science.htm  
32
 For an analysis of the negotiation process that led to the adoption of the SPS Agreement see T Buthe, above note 21. 
33
 FAO/WHO 1995, above note 30, also discussed by Jukes, above note 31.  
34
 Emphasis added 
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process. The Statements of Principle are valid until today as they have been integrated in the 
Procedural Manual and are still referred to by the Working Principles for Risk Analysis.
35
  
While it is clear that Codex started to profile itself as a science-based institution, the question of the 
relation between ‘sound science’ and ‘other legitimate factors’ remained open. The debate became 
very heated in the controversial process that led to the adoption of standards for growth promoting 
hormones. In 1987, the JECFA assigned Acceptable Daily Intakes (ADIs) for a number of growth 
promoters used in farm animals (particularly cattle) and maintained that it was not necessary to 
establish Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs).
36
 Following the JECFA opinion sic et simpliciter would 
have implied the adoption of Codex standards for the controversial growth promoting hormones. 
However, a number of countries, led by the European Communities, opposed these standards because 
of consumers concerns as well as concerns over the practical difficulties of controlling and enforcing 
the administration of the hormones in meat.
37
 The Codex Committee on Residues of Veterinary Drugs 
in Food (CCRVDF) considered the standards in October 1989
38
 and put them forward for a Codex 
decision. As the standard reached step 8 in 1991, when the draft for the SPS Agreement was ready, 
Codex members were split as to the adoptions of these standards. In this context, ‘sound science’ and 
‘other legitimate factors’ have been used as arguments to defend the opposite positions of the US and 
the European Communities. Besides the divisions on the questions of whether standards should have 
been adopted, Codex members seemed to agree that adopting standards would have meant endorsing a 
sound science approach, whereas the decision of not adopting the standards could have been based on 
‘other legitimate factors’. In a 1991 discussion of the matter, the Codex Secretariat informed the 
Commission that the ‘FAO Legal Counsel had noted that the Statutes, Rules and Procedures of the 
Commission did not bind the Commission to science as the basis of the decision-making process’. In 
later documents, the US contrasted this view arguing that ‘Codex … must show that its standards … 
rested on a sound scientific basis,’ meaning that a departure from JECFA opinion would have 
corresponded to a scientifically unsound decision.
39
 This use of the term ‘sound science’ has 
proliferated ever since. But is it analytically accurate and intellectually honest to juxtapose sound 
science to other legitimate factors? The next section will argue that it is not. 
4. Why does my heart feels so bad? Ractopamine and Scientism limits 
On July 5, 2012, Codex has adopted standards on MRLs for ractopamine hydrochloride (ractopamine), 
a beta-agonist used in meat (mainly in pigs and cattle) for achieving fast growth and leanness of the 
meat.
40
 The process that has led to the adoption of the standards is unusually controversial and it 
reminds the hormones episode. The Codex standard was not adopted by consensus, as it is normally 
the case, but by a vote in which a thin majority voted in favour of the standard (69 in favour vs. 67 
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 Codex Alimentarius Commission, 21st edition, Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, FAO, Rome 2013. 
36
 The hormones for which standards were adopted are the following Estradiol 17, Testosterone, progesterone, trenbolone 
and zeranol. 
37
 For the record of the debate where different arguments were reported see FAO/WHO (1991). Codex Alimentarius 
Commission - Report of the 19th Session. (ALINORM 91/40). FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, Rome; 
(arguments of the EEC at para. 155) 
38
 CCRVDF (1989). Report of the Fourth Session of the Codex Committee on Residues of Veterinary Drugs in Foods, 24-
27 October 1989. (ALINORM 91/31) Codex Alimentarius Commission. 
39
 10th Session of the Codex Committee on General Principles, 1992. As quoted in Jukes, above note 31. 
40
 There are three commercial products derived from ractopamine: Paylean, Optaflexx and Tomax, administered 
respectively to pigs, cattle and turkeys. Ractopamine is widely used in the US. For a more in depth description of the use 
of the drug in factory farming see A Alemanno and G Capodieci, ‘Testing the Limits of Global Food Governance: The 
Case of Ractopamine’ (2012) 3 European Journal of Risk Regulation, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2133908.  
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opposing and 7 abstentions).
41
 About 160 countries, including major meat importers and exporters, 
such as China and the EU, do not allow the use of ractopamine. The risks related to the administration 
of ractopamine in animals were assessed a number of times by the JECFA: in 1993, 2004, 2006 and 
2010 respectively. In its first 1993 evaluation, the JECFA did not establish Acceptable Daily Intakes 
(ADIs) for ractopamine, because of lack of data to determine safe levels.
42
 In its subsequent 
evaluations in 2004, the JECFA assigned both ADIs and MRLs on the basis of new data provided by 
Elanco, the major producer of ractopamine.
43
 The recommendations were later confirmed, also when 
revised on the basis of new data.
44
 
The adoption of MRLs for ractopamine has been hailed as a victory of science-based regulation. 
The adoption of the standard has been characterized by Kathy Simmons, the National Cattlemen’s 
Beef Association (NCBA) chief veterinarian, as ‘the Codex decision to move forward with science-
based standards’.45 Likewise the American delegate, in his oral statements at the 35th Codex session 
concluded that ‘… by not adopting MRLs … we risk other factors to overshadow science … when the 
science is the core competency of Codex’. Countries opposed to the adoption of the standards have 
lamented the fact that ‘[a]s an international organisation seeking to harmonise standards across the 
globe, Codex should respect consensus-based decision-making, one of the fundamental principles of 
the organisation. It is clear that for standards to be universally applicable, they also need to be 
universally accepted.’46 Interestingly, the two arguments used to defend opposite positions seem to 
echo the schism sound science/other legitimate factors. To understand the troubling feature of this 
schism it may be useful to briefly introduce some of the science underpinnings the arguments that 
have been used to oppose the use of ractopamine for factory farming.  
A. The Science of Ractopamine Politics 
Ractopamine, a phenethanolamine -adrenoceptor agonist (beta-agonist), is administered to animals, 
to increase the rate of weight gain and the leanness of the carcasses.
47
 Such effects, in turn, increase 
the economic value of the animal.
48
 Ractopamine works by accelerating the heart-beat and it causes 
the relaxation of blood vessels. The drug has not been approved for human use and producers 
acknowledge its negative effects. For example, the label of Paylean (the commercial version of 
ractopamine administered to pigs) explicitly states that the drug is not for human use and that 
‘individuals with cardiovascular disease should exercise special caution to avoid exposure’.  
                                                     
41
 For early comments on the ractopamine case see, A Alemanno and G Capodieci, above note 40; C-F Lin, ‘Scientification 
of Politics or Politicization of Science: Reassessing the Limits of the Codex Alimentarius Commission’ (2013) Columbia 
Science and Technology Law Review, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2227539.  
42
 This was decided during JECFA 40th meeting. 
43
 Elanco is a subsidiary of Ely Lilli. 
44
 The JECFA monographs on ractopamine and the respective standards are available at: http://www.fao.org/food/food-
safety-quality/scientific-advice/jecfa/jecfa-vetdrugs/en/. The MRLs established by JECFA related to different parts 
of the meat; they are 10 g/kg for muscle and fat for cattle and pigs, 40 g/kg for liver and 90 g/kg for kidney; the ADI 
are 0-1g/kg bw. 
45
 Emphasis added; as reported in Rutherford, ‘Codex Commission Adopts Global Standards For Ractopamine 
Hydrochloride’, (July 5, 2012) Beef, available at http://beefmagazine.com/health/codex-commission-adopts-global-
standards-ractopamine-hydrochloride (last visited 8 May 2014). 
46
 Codex Alimentarius Commission (35th Session) Rome, 2 - 7 July 2012, EU Statement on ractopamine. available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/ifsi/eupositions/cac/cac_index_en.html (last visited 8 May 2014). 
47
 See the label of Paylean (the commercial version of ractopamine used in finishing swine). 
48
 According to data from Elanco, the increased gain are $ 2 per head; as reported by H Bottemiller, ‘Dispute Over Drug in 
Feed Limiting US Meat Exports’, (January 25, 2012) Food and Environmental Reporting Network, available at 
http://thefern.org/2012/01/dispute-over-drug-in-feed-limiting-u-s-meat-exports/ (last visited 8 May 2014). 
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The concerns over the use of ractopamine are of different kinds. Some relate to human health and 
others to animal health and welfare. In relation to human health, the concern is rather straightforward: 
given its properties of accelerating heart-beat, being exposed to residues of such a substance may 
increase the risks related to cardiovascular diseases. JECFA, by recommending MRLs has clearly 
considered these risks negligible.
49
 However, the risk assessment conducted by the JECFA has been 
criticized, among others, by the scientific food safety body of the European Union, the European Food 
and Safety Authority (EFSA). According to a lengthy Opinion of the EFSA Panel on Additives and 
Products or Substances used in Animal Feed (FEEDAP), administering ractopamine to animals could 
possibly be dangerous to humans exposed to traces of it. The main argument of the FEEDAP is that 
data are not sufficient to derive safe residue levels, particularly in relation to most vulnerable groups 
such as people with cardiovascular diseases or children. Methodologically, the FEEDAP contested the 
appraisal by JECFA because ‘… the safety factor applied by JECFA to derive the ADI from the 
NOEL does not sufficiently take into account population subsets at higher risk of adverse events after 
ß-adrenergic stimulation’.50  
Without entering into the merits of the dispute, one thing is clear. Two scientific panels reached 
different conclusions on the safety of a certain substance. The Panels are both institutional bodies, 
composed of arguably well-established ‘regulatory scientists’. Arguing that following JECFA 
recommendations is sound science and all the rest is not means disqualifying EFSA science as 
unsound. The boundary work implicit in this logic should be puzzling for legal scholars and policy 
makers. Labelling as sound science only the recommendation coming from Codex expert bodies 
means entrusting the monopoly of science to a few dozens of embedded scientists. The risk is that 
global trade wars will be transformed into turf wars among few experts on narrowly defined scientific 
issues. But who would subscribe to such a model? The first lesson from the ractopamine case is that a 
purely technocratic paradigm is at best reductivist and at worst illiberal. 
The other concerns on the use of ractopamine are related to animal welfare and health. Several 
studies have shown that animals treated with ractopamine become more aggressive and difficult to 
handle,
 51
 and as a consequence are ‘more likely to be subjected to rough handling and increased stress 
during transportation.’52 In light of these studies, the FEEDAP expressed concerns in relation to the 
safety of the pigs. While there may remain some doubts as to the extent of the phenomenon, it is 
undeniable that ractopamine has some negative effects on animal welfare.
53
 Even producers have a 
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 Another question, not discussed in this section, is the residue levels of ractopamine in different body organs of the animal 
(particularly offal). China was particularly concerned with higher concentration of the substance in offal, given the 
consumption of offal by Chinese and submitted new studies to JECFA. JECFA reviewed the studies and concluded that, 
besides concentration in lungs, her previous assessment, recommending ADIs and MRLs were not to be reviewed; see 
JECFA Monograph, No. 9. (2010). 
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 Scientific Opinion of the Panel on Additives and Products or Substances used in Animal Feed (FEEDAP) on a request 
from the European Commission on the safety evaluation of ractopamine. The EFSA Journal (2009) 1041, 1-52. 
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 JN Marchant-Forde, DC Lay Jr., EA Pajor et al., ‘The effects of Ractopamine on the Behavior and Physiology of 
Finishing Pigs’ (2003) 81(2) Journal of Animal Science 416; R Poletto, HW Cheng, RL Meisel et al., ‘Aggressiveness 
and Brain Amine Concentration in Dominant and Subordinate Finishing Pigs fed the β-adrenoreceptor agonist 
ractopamine’ (2010) 88(9) Journal of Animal Science 3107. As reported by Marchant-Forde et al. ‘Pigs fed ractopamine 
were more difficult to handle and had elevated heart rates and catecholamine levels after 4 weeks of administration. Pigs 
that are more difficult to move are more likely to be subjected to rough handling and increased stress during 
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52
 The EFSA Journal, above note 51, at 1041. 
53
 According to one report ‘[w]hen Elanco studied the drug in pigs for its effectiveness, it reported that “no adverse effects 
were observed for any treatments.” But within a few years of Paylean’s approval, the company received hundreds of 
reports of sickened pigs from farmers and veterinarians, according to records from the FDA’s Center for Veterinary 
Medicine.’ 
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disclaimer in this regard on the label; Paylean label reads: ‘Caution: Ractopamine may increase the 
number of injured or fatigued pigs during marketing. Not for use in breeding swine.’54  
The question of animal welfare has been often listed among the ‘other legitimate factors’ that ought 
to be taken into account in the context of Codex decision-making. For the purpose of our analysis, it is 
worth emphasizing that no matter under which category we may want to put the category of animal 
welfare, the studies showing the effects on the animals can be plausibly classified as scientific. Thus, 
even when animal welfare is considered under the rubric of ‘other legitimate factors’, to stigmatize as 
unscientific a decisions taken on such basis is incorrect and possibly demagogic.  
Some commentators have pointed at the ractopamine case, which is echoing the previous hormones 
case, as evidence of Codex’s limits.55 However, rather than Codex’s limits, the ractopamine case 
points at the limits of a rigid technocratic model of legitimacy, that proves untenable before a political 
and scientific divided community.  
B. The Sound of Science: Science vs Scientism 
As illustrated above, decisions diverging from the recommendations of Codex expert bodies may be 
scientifically sound as much as those portrayed as science-based. Disagreement among scientists may 
legitimately exist because science does not provide univocal answers to policy problems, in contrast 
with what an over-simplistic view of science may suggest. Science is fraught with uncertainties and 
value-choices: models of extrapolation (from animals to humans) can be more or less conservative; 
decisions to study certain variables (and certain hazards) instead of others may differ; some studies 
may look at potential effects on average people, while others may consider vulnerable groups (e.g. 
children, pregnant women, people with diseases, etc.); studies can consider cumulative effects or not 
and so on. This means that within the realm of scientific studies it is possible to reach different 
conclusions, all plausible according to generally agreed standards of how to conduct scientific 
research. Moreover, the assessment of factors outside the scope of the reports of Codex expert 
committees, such as JECFA, is not in itself unscientific. The assessments of effects on animal welfare 
and/or on the environment are as scientific as the assessment of the carcinogenic properties of a certain 
substance and the relative risks to humans. Symmetrically, the judgments of whether it is acceptable to 
let animal suffer or to pollute the environment or to allow the marketing of a substance with a 
carcinogenic potential are all equally political. It is thus unfortunate that the term ‘sound science’ is 
often used to stigmatize all the standards not based on the recommendations of Codex expert bodies. 
Using the jargon sound science to characterize only specific assessments of certain types of risk and 
discount all other considerations as unscientific is either banal, or parochial. 
Political scientists have coined the term ‘scientism’, to refer to a ‘discourse or framework for 
discussion that excludes considerations of distributional and other social impact criteria in the 
determination by a regulatory agency that a product is or is not suitable for markets … In its neoliberal 
form, scientism tends to restrict democratic participation and weakens the option for governments to 
regulate ….’56 This concern is echoed by Winickoff and Bushey who worry that in the context of 
Codex the adoption of ‘risk as the single dominant grammar of global food regulation’ may create 
certain governance biases: ‘[r]isk discourse implicitly empowers some people as experts while 
marginalizing others as inarticulate or irrelevant.’57 To better understand how a reductivist view of the 
                                                     
54
 available at: http://www.elanco.us/products-services/swine/feed-efficiency-finishing-swine.aspx (last visited on 27 March 
2014) 
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 Lin, above note 41. 
56
 Moore et al., ‘Science and Neoliberal Globalization: A Political Sociological Approach’ (2011) 40 Theory and Society, at 
517. 
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 Winickoff and Bushey, above note 21, 364  
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risk analysis paradigm can degenerate into scientism and create a regime of exclusion, it is worth a 
brief excursion into the academic literature on risk.
58
  
Social scientists have amply shown that, beyond the conclusions of so-called experts, there are 
many factors that could be legitimately taken into account when deciding about risks. Several studies 
in the field of cognitive psychology have shown that people value different qualitative characteristics 
of risks and do not merely focus on the probabilities related to morbidity and mortality.
59
 For instance, 
people prefer voluntary over involuntary risks, they are sensitive towards perceived inequities of 
distribution of risks, and so on.
60
 Preferences towards risk are also shaped by culture.
61
 Several studies 
have shown that people sharing similar values fear similar risks; for instance, egalitarians tend to be 
more afraid of environmental risks and the risks of gun possession, whereas individualists may be 
more concerned about security issues and disfavour gun controls. The different attitudes of Americans 
and Europeans towards biotech food products may then be seen as pertaining to ‘cultural cognition’ 
rather than stemming from different attitudes towards science. As put by Kahan et al., ‘[i]f risk 
disputes are really disputes over the good life, then the challenge that risk regulation poses for 
democracy is less how to reconcile public sensibilities with science than how to accommodate 
different visions of the good within a popular system of regulation.’ 62  
Against this background it may be clear why the risk analysis paradigm enlisted by the 
WTO/Codex co-produced regime risks being a form scientism, if it is not entrenched in democratic 
values. Acknowledging the role that values play within scientific processes does not mean to corrupt 
science with values; to the contrary, it means aspiring to a more transparent scientific process that can 
enable dialogue on divisive issues.  
5. An Evolving Regime: Marrying Science and Democracy? 
If technocracy may have been the driving paradigm in the post-WTO phase of Codex, the incapability 
of this paradigm to solve international trade disputes is becoming apparent. The main claim of this 
article is that the ‘regulatory epistemology’63 that has driven the erection of the global regime, co-
produced by Codex and WTO institutions, is changing. The emerging paradigm is not a radical 
departure from technocracy, but it could be seen as an attempt to reconcile technocratic and 
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 While the scholarship on risk is vast, this article will deal only with a limited subset of studies. Important contributions 
not discussed in this article, and yet relevant fir the issues discussed, are: SO Funtowicz and JR Ravetz, ‘Science for the 
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Perception and risk Communication’, in DG Mayo and RD Hollander (eds), Acceptable Evidence - Science and Value in 
Risk Management (1991), 48. 
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 P Slovic, above note 59. 
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Slovic, D Braman, and J Gastil, ‘Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk’, (2006) 119 (4) Harvard 
Law Review, 1071. 
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 Kahan et al., above note 61, at 1073. 
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 The term is used by Winickoff and Bushey to refer to the ‘norms and practices for the management of knowledge, 
expertise, and evidence in regulatory decision making’ and it draws on the concept of civic epistemology previously 
elaborated by Sheila Jasanoff; see S Jasanoff ‘Ordering Knowledge, Ordering Society’. In: S Jasanoff (ed) States of 
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democratic approaches to food safety regulation. Such an approach is more in line with a model 
advocated by a rich and diverse body of social science scholarship, briefly presented above.  
A. WTO jurisprudence  
As already explained, with the establishment of the WTO, the international trade system has been 
endowed with a unique dispute settlement mechanism. This system does not only confer normative 
byte to WTO obligations, but it also greatly contributes to the clarification and evolution of trade rules. 
Paying attention to how the rules of the SPS and TBT Agreements are being interpreted is thus crucial 
for a better understanding of the global regime for food safety standards.  
The SPS Agreement allows WTO Members to adopt sanitary and phytosanitary measures more 
stringent than international standards (in our case, Codex standards), only when these measures are 
justified by risk assessment or when there is no sufficient scientific evidence to base the measures on 
risk assessment.
64
 The concepts of ‘risk assessment’ and ‘(in-)sufficiency of scientific evidence’ are 
then crucial in understanding the role of Codex standards in the international regulatory space. A 
broad interpretation of these conceptual categories will imply that WTO Members have more freedom 
to diverge from Codex standards and vice versa. It follows that the degree of normativity of Codex 
provisions depends on how the provisions of the SPS Agreement are interpreted. At a more 
fundamental level, the interpretation of concepts such as a risk assessment reflects the regulatory 
epistemology endorsed by WTO institutions.  
A key case to understand the turn taken by WTO jurisprudence in the interpretation of the SPS 
Agreement is Canada/US – Continued Suspension. This case is the follow-up of the Hormones case. 
Let me briefly summarize the main steps that led to the Continued Suspension dispute, for the readers 
not familiar with this body of case law. After the Appellate Body ruling in EC - Hormones, where 
Europe was faulted for not having based its measures on risk assessment, the US and Canada were 
allowed to retaliate against the non-compliant Union. In the meanwhile, Europe asked its food-science 
body, then the Scientific Committee on Veterinary Measures relating to Public Health (SCVPH), to 
conduct a new risk assessment of the disputed hormones.
65
 On the basis of the new SCVPH opinion, 
Europe amended its laws, adopting Directive 2003/74/EC, which prohibits the use of oestradiol-17β 
for growth promotion purposes because of its carcinogenic and genotoxic properties and it prohibits, 
on a provisional basis, the other disputed hormones because the available data, while indicative of risk, 
were not sufficient to conduct a proper risk assessment. At this point, Europe argued that it was 
complying with the AB ruling in EC – Hormones. The US and Canada did not agree and continued to 
retaliate. As the WTO dispute settlement understanding (DSU) is silent on what do in these cases, 
Europe initiated a new dispute against the US to challenge the legality of their retaliatory measures. In 
Canada/US – Continued Suspension, the AB did not resolve the saga about the use of hormones for 
growth promotion purposes
66
 but, in reversing the Panel’s Report,67 has shed light on the interpretation 
of crucial norms for the global governance of food safety.
 
Most importantly, the concepts of ‘risk 
assessment’ and ‘sufficiency of scientific evidence’ have been interpreted by the Appellate Body as 
‘relational’ concepts; this implies that issues, such as ‘the appropriate level of protection’ chosen by a 
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government, can shape the methodology and questions studied in the risk assessment.
68
 Such a 
conceptualization subscribes to a vision of science that is shaped by social values. The Appellate Body 
in Continued Suspension has unequivocally embraced this approach, as evidenced by the following 
quote: 
The risk assessment cannot be entirely isolated from the appropriate level of protection. There may 
be circumstances in which the appropriate level of protection chosen by a Member affects the 
scope or method of the risk assessment. This may be the case where a WTO Member decides not 
to adopt an SPS measure based on an international standard because it seeks to achieve a higher 
level of protection. In such a situation, the fact that the WTO Member has chosen to set a higher 
level of protection may require it to perform certain research as part of its risk assessment that is 
different from the parameters considered and the research carried out in the risk assessment 
underlying the international standard.
 69 
The quote shows how the Appellate Body has relativized the centrality of international standards. 
Hence, international standards may be less central than previously thought. In the ractopamine case, 
where the EFSA report focused on risks left unaddressed by JEFCA (e.g. risks to people with 
cardiovascular diseases), it may well be the case that Codex standards will not be decisive in the 
determination of compliance with WTO law.  
The turn taken by the Appellate Body in Continued Suspension can be read as a more general sign 
that the regulatory epistemology underpinning the global food safety regime rests on a vision of 
science that acknowledges its value-laden nature. This turn may have been favoured by the experience 
gained during the development of SPS jurisprudence. The evolution of the Hormones case is 
exemplary of the limits of scientism and thus, it may be no coincidence that in Continued Suspension 
the Appellate Body has clarified that the WTO regime needs to deal with the value-laden nature of 
science. Moreover in another salient case, the EC – Biotech, where the European regulatory regime of 
Genetically Modified Organisms was at stake, the WTO was directly exposed to the reasoning of 
social scientists. In fact, a group of well-known social scientists submitted an Amicus Brief to the 
Panel in EC – Biotech where the arguments showing the value-laden nature of science are lucidly 
presented.
70
 While the EC – Biotech case never reached the appeal stage, it is likely that the Appellate 
Body has been exposed to the Amicus Brief submitted in the Biotech case. Is this approach also 
reflected by Codex?  
B. Codex General Principles for Risk Analysis  
In spite of the emphasis placed on science-based decisionmaking, the new approach endorsed by the 
Appellate Body is also compatible with the general principles for risk analysis negotiated and agreed 
at Codex. Two key documents define these principles: 1) the Working Principles for Risk Analysis for 
Food Safety for Application by Governments
71
 (Working Principles for Governments) and 2) the 
‘Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the Framework of the Codex Alimentarius’ 
(Working Principles for Codex).
72
 Both sets of principles have been negotiated for several years and 
both have been adopted in the new millennium (in 2007 and 2003 respectively) and may thus be seen 
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30 Yale Journal of International Law 81. 
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72
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as representing the existing consensus on the constitutive elements of risk analysis. They are therefore 
an important piece of the puzzle in understanding the regulatory epistemology underpinning the 
current global food safety regime.  
Both sets of principles share similar features. The principles endorse an Anglo-Saxon model of risk 
analysis originally articulated in the US in the 1983 National Research Council (NRC)’s report on Risk 
Assessment in the Federal Government – Managing the Process, also known as the Red Book.73 
According to this Report risk assessment is separated from risk management. This functional 
separation is clearly endorsed by Codex principles, where it is established that ‘[t]here should be a 
functional separation of risk assessment and risk management’.74 The debate on the functional 
separation between risk assessment and risk management has evolved over time and, within the US, 
several NRC reports succeeding the Red Book asserted the importance of having an iterative process 
where risk assessment and management are in a dialogical relationship.
75
 The acknowledgement of the 
importance of a linkage between the two phases is premised on the idea of value-laden science. 
In line with the evolution of this debate, Codex principles also acknowledge the need of linking 
risk assessment and risk management and set limits to the functional separation of the two. In the first 
place, risk assessment and risk management are to be separated ‘to the degree practicable’.76 In 
addition, the risk analysis process is framed as an iterative one: ‘it is recognized that risk analysis is an 
iterative process, and interaction between risk managers and risk assessors is essential for practical 
application.’77 Even more importantly, both sets of principles recognize that ‘Precaution is an inherent 
element of risk analysis.’78  
Asserting the importance of the interaction of risk assessment and risk management, as well as 
recognizing the role of precaution in risk analysis, means acknowledging the value-laden nature of 
science. In other words, the ‘technē’ or ‘episteme’ that serves the decisionmaking process is itself 
shaped by values. While other Codex documents and general principles may still be inspired by a 
narrow vision of science and display a technocratic aspiration, the conceptualization of risk analysis in 
the Working Principles contrasts with an eminently technocratic approach. It can thus be concluded 
that the current guidelines for risk analysis are not informed by a purely technocratic approach, which 
is commonly associated with Codex practices.  
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6. Concluding remarks 
The locution ‘sound science’ has dominated the global battlefield of food politics. It has been often 
used to defend measures following from the recommendations of Codex expert bodies and to discount 
all the rest as unscientific. The ractopamine case, where different scientific bodies have produced 
diverging opinions, shows that science cannot be the ultimate arbiter on divisive issues fraught with 
uncertainties. As beautifully put by Bruno Latour: ‘When scientists add their findings to the mix, they 
do not put an end to politics; they add new ingredients to the collective process.’79 The challenge for 
the 21
st
 century is thus to rethink our legal and political institutions so that they can better cope with 
the value-laden nature of science. While the ractopamine case shows the problematic side of global 
food politics, this article suggests that the coproduced regime by the WTO and Codex is starting to 
take up this challenge. 
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